Should Judges be Elected by the People, or by the Governor?

There is a proposal in the Minnesota Legislature to take away the right of Minnesota voters to elect new judges.  Minnesota's judges are promoting a change to Minnesota's Constitution that would let two people - the governor and the Chief Justices of Minnesota's Supreme Court  - control the selection of all new judges.  This proposal is known as the Quie Commission bill.

When voters are allowed to select their judges in a contested election, the results generally are outstanding.  This was demonstrated again in Ramsey County this past November.  Judge John Finley retired at the end of his term.  This created a vacancy that was filled by a contested election.  Five candidates conducted campaigns that were nonpartisan and responsible.  The voters made a superb choice.

The real problem with the Quie Commision is that voters are not given the opportunity to elect their judges.  An amendment to Minnesota's Constitution is not needed.  Polls have shown that, at least at present, over ninety percent of the people are against giving up their right to elect their judges.

The Quie Commission report makes the following recommendations:

The Commission recommends that the Appellate Court Selection Commission be composed of nine members, four of whom would be non-lawyers.  The governor and the chief justice would each appoint four members and the governor would appoint the chair of the Commission.

The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission will be a body of thirty members, the majority of whom will be non-lawyers, with the governor and chief justice appointing half of the members.

With respect to district court vacancies, the Commission recommends that the existing procedure set forth in Minnesota Statutes Section 480B.01 be followed.  These procedures provide for a Committee on Judicial Selection whose members are appointed by the governor and the seven Supreme Court Justices.

The above provisions gives two people - the governor and Chief Justices of the Supreme Court - the power to control the selection and evaluation of all judges.  No other state gives such power to such a small number of people.

A problem not addressed in the Quie Commission Report is the funding of judicial re-election campaigns.  Records of the Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board show that over ninety percent of the contributions to judicial re-election campaigns come from law firms (generally the big firms) , lawyers and special interests.  Incumbent judges are being bought.  North Carolina enacted a law that solves that problem.  It provides public funds for judge campaigns with no funds from public taxes.  The North Carolina plan is working.  Shouldn't we at least consider it?

Bold Opposition to the Quie Commission 

Proposed Bill to Protect MN citizens

Subdivision 1.  Mandatory retirement date.  Mandatory retirement date means December 31 of the year of a general election after an incumbent judge has reached 72 years of age.

Subdivision 2.  Election of successor judge.  A successor to an incumbent judge will be elected in a general election when (a) the incumbent judge will reach his mandatory retirement date in the year of the general election, or (b) the incumbent judge does not commit by May 1 of the year of a general election to continuing to serve in the office he holds for a period of two years after December 31 of that year except as otherwise provided in this section. Notwithstanding any commitment to continue in office, an incumbent judge may resign or retire at any time from the office of judge without any penalty if he is unable to continue serving as judge for a compelling physical or personal reason as provided herein, or if he is elected or appointed to serve on a higher court.

Subdivision 3.  Judge retirement or resignation; compelling physical or personal reason.  As contemplated by this section, a compelling physical or personal reason for retiring or resigning from the office of judge is a physical condition that renders the judge unable to perform the duties of his office, or the need to care for a member of his immediate family, either of which reason shall be approved by the Judicial Commission.

Subdivision 4.  Judge pension; partial forfeiture.  A judge who resigns from office under circumstances that enable the governor to appoint his successor forfeits twenty-five percent of the pension he would have received unless the resignation was for compelling physical or personal reason as provided in this section, or the judge was elected or appointed to serve on a higher court.

Subd. 5.  Incumbent judge retention elections.  An incumbent judge who first gained the office of judge by winning a competitive election in which he received forty-eight percent or more of the votes cast in that election shall run unopposed to continue in that office.

Subd. 6.  Incumbent judge; defeat.  An incumbent judge who runs in a retention election is defeated and shall vacate the office of judge if he does not receive fifty percent or more of the votes cast in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which his election was conducted.

Subd.  7.  Judge elections; electing jurisdiction.  The election of a judge for a particular judgeship shall be by the voters of the county or counties assigned to that judgship.

Subd. 8.  Judge elections; designation of incumbent.  The word incumbent shall not appear on any ballot under the name of any incumbent judge or candidate for the office of judge.

Judge and Judicial Official Accountability - Judicial Oversight - Legal Information Center

Minnesota's Constitution states (Article VI, Section 9): The legislature may also provide for the retirement, removal or other discipline of any judge who is disabled, incompetent or guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The bill proposes a process for implementing this provision of our Constitution.

The bill creates a unit of the legislature that will provide oversight of the judicial branch of government.  The basic concept is the same as underlies the Office of the Legislative Auditor which provides oversight of the executive branch of government.  Currently, the legislature has left oversight of the judicial branch to itself through the Judicial Standards Board.  Oversight by that board is veery suspect and is widely recognized as ineffective.  The proposed oversight board would replace the Judicial Standards Board which would be abolished.

The proposed oversight board would not have the authority or power to change any decision or order of any judge or the application or effect of any decision, order or judgment.  This power would remain solely in the judiciary.

The proposed bill establishes standards of conduct for judges including prohibitions and makes it an offense for a judge or judicial official to violate the standards of conduct the bill establishes.  The bill lists the sanctions it can assess if a judge or judicial official violates the standards of conduct.

Substantial protection against frivolous claims against judges and judicial officials is included in the bill. 

The proposed bill provides for performance evaluation of the work of judges and reports to voters before elections.  The proposed structure has several similarities to the Rest Bill. The major difference is that the proposed evaluation system is independent of the judicial and executive branches of government in the same manner as the Office of the Legislative Auditor.  We do not think it is appropriate for judges to evaluated themselves and that lawyers have a conflict in evaluating judges before whom they may appear.  As an alterative, we propose a professional staff that works for the legislature to advise citizen evaluation panels.. 

The bill also establishes a legal system information center where a person can get information (but not legal advice) on lawyers, judges, the legal system, legal subjects etc.,.  The information center would include a roster of lawyers and information about the services they provide, their qualifications and Martindale-Hubble rating, and their charges.  As a qualification of being listed on this roster, a lawyer would have to agree to provide quality services to his clients and to resolve a complaint by a client about his or her services by binding arbitration before a district court judge.  The information center is proposed as a revenue generating agency.  It would replace many of the information services now provided by the Attorney General of Minnesota. 

The proposed bill is revenue neutral.  If implemented as proposed, it would not require public funding.

 Another great site is www.thetruthaboutMinnesota.org